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 Bureaucracy intermediaries,
corruption and red tape
Third-party intermediaries that help individuals and ﬁrms
navigate government bureaucracy are common in
developing countries. Although such intermediaries are
often, anecdotally, linked with corruption, research
suggests that, in some cases, intermediaries actually help
improve access to the bureaucracy.
Intermediaries that assist individuals and firms with government
bureaucracy are common in developing countries. In a recent
paper in the Journal of Development Economics I focus on their
role as time savers, and study the impact on citizen welfare and
red tape, with non-trivial results. I then use the model to
analyse the impact of bureaucracy reform on intermediary
usage. I apply the analysis to a Brazilian bureaucracy reform
that has served as inspiration for other countries.
Model of bureaucracy intermediaries
I first present evidence of the existence of bureaucracy
intermediaries in different countries. Next, based on the
assumption that such intermediaries are a device for time saving
when interacting with the government bureaucracy, I construct
a model to address several questions: What is the welfare
impact on citizens – meaning the ease/difficulty in obtaining
permits, licences and personal documents – as a result of the
existence of the intermediary sector? What is the result on the
length/complexity of licensing procedures? Under what
circumstances can we expect the intermediary sector to arise?
By stressing time-saving the model differs from previous papers,
which have primarily focused on the role of intermediaries in
facilitating rule-breaking. The final section of the paper applies
the theoretical model to analyse a recent Brazilian bureaucracy
reform.
In the model, government bureaucrats handle licence
applications both directly from individuals, but also indirectly,
through intermediaries. A surplus becomes available when
individuals use intermediaries, instead of queuing at the
bureaucracy or going between different offices, a surplus that
bureaucrats want to capture. A straightforward and intuitive
result from this analysis is that individuals using intermediaries
are better off, as the surplus is basically split between
individuals and bureaucrats.
Although there is a general lack of data on bureaucracy
intermediaries, the paper presents some evidence, from Brazil
and India, that the existence of an intermediary sector goes
hand in hand with complicated licensing procedures. How does
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hand in hand with complicated licensing procedures. How does
such a correlation come about, however? By studying
bureaucrats’ incentives to complicate licensing procedures, I
show that the “optimal” degree of complication increases when
intermediaries exist, as opposed to when citizens only have the
opportunity to pay “speed money” directly to bureaucrats. As a
result, citizens end up with longer procedures and less gain from
licensing, i.e. the previous welfare result is reversed.
In sum, the paper proposes an argument, based on time saving
and intermediaries, to understand why “endogenous red tape”
may arise, and establishes its (negative) impact on citizens.
One stop shops for government services
Many Brazilian states have implemented Citizen Service
Centers, which are “one stop shops” for government services.
In the state of São Paulo, Poupatempo (Meaning ‘Save time’)
co-locates several different government authorities in the same
physical building and assures a speedier treatment, such that
citizens can typically resolve errands in fewer visits/less amount
of time. Poupatempo units were first implemented in the
metropolitan area, then in populous municipalities in the
interior of the state. Almost 400 million errands, mainly related
to personal documents such as ID, employment books and
renewal of driving licence, have been handled since 1997.
Poupatempo was implemented in addition to the pre-existing
bureaucracy, giving citizens a choice whether to use
Poupatempo or the “old” bureaucracy. I use the theoretical
model to show that even if the rules and regulations to e.g.
renew a driving licence are the same at Poupatempo, citizens
will find the services of time-saving bureaucracy intermediaries
less valuable. In addition, incentives in the “old” bureaucracy to
create red tape are weakened, which benefits citizens. The
currently available evidence suggests that Poupatempo is likely
to have considerably reduced the use of intermediaries over the
last decade. Representatives from several countries, including
Kenya, Mozambique and South Africa, but also from Latin
American, European and Asian countries, have visited
Poupatempo or implemented similar reforms.
Resistance towards bureaucracy reform
In terms of the theory presented, one could certainly imagine
resistance from the bureaucrats standing to lose rents when the
parallel structure is implemented. In a study entitled “Brazil is
not for amateurs”, Belmiro Castor describes such efforts to
block reform in the past. So how did the reform come about?
Many factors, potentially context specific, may have influenced.
One novel feature of Poupatempo is that it was implemented as
an “institutional bypass”. The reform did not attempt to change
the structure or the modus operandi of the traditional
bureaucracy. Instead, a parallel structure was implemented. The
duplication increased costs, but may also have decreased
resistance from “old bureaucracy” interest groups of
bureaucrats, intermediaries etc., although political will was
indeed important to overcome such resistance.
